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 One believes whatever one believes only because one cannot help believing it. It happens 
to everybody, and should be no matter for regret or reproach. We are all born dogmatists. There 
are many people, however, who try to gain private benefit from our credulity. They should be 
ashamed of themselves, and are often punished by the law. And there are still other people who 
believe our doxastic dogmatism to be reasonably defensible on reflective grounds. It is this 
minority of philosophers and epistemologists that bothers the sceptic. He maintains that theoretical 
dogmatists too should be ashamed of themselves. And he tries to show them why by confuting 
their theories, while accepting the rules of their conceptual games. Dogmatism is a natural 
phenomenon, and so is the desire to defend it. Hence the toils of the sceptic never end. Fogelin's 
book is the most recent of them. 
 The work falls into two parts that fit nicely together, on the basis of a common neo-
Pyrrhonian perspective consisting of five premises, two historical and three epistemological: 
H.1) Ancient Pyrrhonism (i) takes philosophy as one of its chief targets; (ii) accepts self-refuting 
arguments as ultimate dialectical weapons that annihilate both their target and themselves; and (iii) 
is "urbane" (the Pyrrhonist is happy to believe most of the things that ordinary people assent to, 
directing his epoche only towards scientific and philosophical theories), not "rustic" (the Pyrrhonist 
has no beliefs whatsoever); 
H.2) (i) "there is an uncanny resemblance between the problems posed by Agrippa's Five Modes 
and those that contemporary epistemologists address under the heading of the theory of 
justification"; but (ii) such a resemblance has "gone largely unnoticed" (p. 11); 
E.1) the arguments of ancient Pyrrhonism can be translated into our philosophical language; 
E.2) once translated, they are sufficiently powerful to undermine any claim the neo-dogmatists 






d.E.3) the conclusion is that "things are now largely as Sextus Empiricus left them almost two 
thousand years ago" (p.11). 
 On the basis of such premises, Fogelin discusses two central areas in contemporary 
epistemology: the Gettier-type problems faced by the definition of knowledge in terms of justified 
true beliefs, and the meta-epistemological problems faced by the theories of justification. The 
former issue, once the technical minutiae are removed, is rather simple: as far as empirical 
knowledge is concerned, the best of all epistemic behaviours is never sufficient to ensure that our 
beliefs may not turn out to be justified but false - warns the sceptic - or true, but just through 
sheer luck - warns Gettier - revealing, in both cases, that we do not know what we are talking 
about. Now if I have understood him properly, Fogelin shows, in a satisfactory manner, that: 
a) any Gettier counter-example contains two notions of justification, one deontic (if S is justified 
in believing that p then his doxastic behaviour is epistemically responsible) and the other objective 
(if S is justified in believing that p then S believes that p on grounds that establish its truth); 
b) any Gettier counter-example is constructed on the basis of "a double informational setting", that 
is a dichotomy between our omniscient status concerning the situation in which S must make up 
his mind, and the limited amount of information that S is provided with. The result is that S does 
his best only in a deontic sense, but - from our God's eye perspective - we can assert that, 
objectively, he still fails to grasp the actual reasons behind the truth of his belief, hence disclosing 
no real knowledge of what he is talking about; 
c) theories that seek to solve Gettier counterexamples by working on the deontic sense of 
justification are bound to accept the dichotomy and hence to fail (chapters 2-4); 
d) on a purely descriptive basis, a theory that puts enough stress on the objective sense of the 
notion of justification avoids the "double informational setting" and would represent a successful 
approach to Gettier counterexamples; 
e) in so far as our linguistic conventions treat the notion of justification also in the objective sense, 
we are capable of asserting, correctly, that S knows that p whenever p is true and S believes that 






d.f) there is, however, no way in which a theory of justification can prove that S knows that 
p without begging the question of its own validation. 
 The latter point is developed in the second half of the book, where theories of justification 
are shown to be incapable of withstanding the impact of Agrippa's three modes. In an attempt to 
provide its own justification, any theory will either run into a vicious circle, start from an arbitrary 
assumption or move into an endless regress. This leaves us with a Humean or urban kind of 
Pyrrhonism: we must suspend judgement when dialectically involved in a dogmatist context, but 
follow our common beliefs and habits in ordinary life. 
 Though not a sceptic myself, I believe that contemporary analytic epistemology needs to 
be reminded that its programme of research has been a failure at least since the third century AD, 
and that Fogelin does so in a very elegant way. The chapter on Davidson, for example, is of such 
clarity and insight that the reader should not miss it, even if this were the only chapter she read. 
But a review would not be worth its name if it did not attempt to point out at least some of the 
limitations of the book under discussion. For reasons of space I shall concentrate on two major 
problems only. 
 Fogelin's elaboration on H.1.iii is sometimes misleading. Firstly, he does not stress enough 
the fact that Barnes' discussion of "rustic" vs. "urban" interpretations of Pyrrhonism concerns the 
Outlines of Pyrrhonism. So, in his argument against Barnes, Fogelin shifts from asserting, with 
Barnes, that "there are no texts in the Outlines" in favour of a rustic interpretation (pp. 6, 9), to 
the much more controversial assertion that "there are no other texts" in its favour (p. 8), thus 
dismissing Diogenes Laertius' Life of Pyrrho as an interesting, though external, source. Secondly, 
even if Fogelin were right in describing the kind of Pyrrhonism presented in the Outlines as 
"urban", the latter cannot be transfigured into a defence of common sense. I believe that, when 
read carefully, Fogelin does not commit such a mistake. But then statements like "traditional 
Pyrrhonists, though defenders of common beliefs against the criticisms of dogmatic 
philosophy, were not proponents of a philosophy of common sense" (p. 10, emphasis added) or 
"In the Introduction I pictured the Pyrrhonian skeptic going through the world claiming to know 






d.(p. 88, repeated on p. 192, emphasis added) are hyperbole, to be interpreted within the 
context of the book cum grano salis. Indeed, nowhere in the Introduction does Fogelin commit 
such an error as picturing the sceptic as someone who claims to know and to have certainties. He 
would have been forced to do so on the basis of Frede's interpretation of Sextus Empiricus, and 
this is not possible, given Sextus' texts. What Fogelin does, following Frede, is to limit the 
sceptical attack, developed by Sextus, to philosophy and scientific disciplines. This is obviously 
different from making him claim to know certain things. Whether "urban" or "rustic", Pyrrhonism 
accepts the possibility of a gap between theory - suspension of judgement - and practice, i.e. the 
passive acceptance, for lack of alternatives, of what appears to be the case. And the best way of 
expressing the point is by noting, as Fogelin does elsewhere, that "the Pyrrhonist undogmatically 
accepts the everyday epistemic practices of his culture" (p. 195), so that in ordinary life he can 
"speak and act in common, sensible ways" (p. 99). The Pyrrhonist follows his beliefs very much 
as my GP smokes cigarettes. 
 Second problem: Fogelin is partially wrong about H.2. Acknowledgement of the 
resemblance must be sought under the heading of the problem of the criterion or, more often, 
of the diallelus. One would then discover that the resemblance is not "uncanny", and that the 
problem discussed by Fogelin has three complex roots in the history of epistemology: (a) the 
contemporary debate within the German tradition, e.g. Albert's "Münchhausen-Trilemma", which 
can be traced to its Kantian origins (Hegel's "Scholasticus' absurd resolution") through the neo-
Kantian and Popperian discussion of "Fries' trilemma"; (b) that within the English tradition 
(Chisholm's Problem of the Criterion), which has Cartesian and sceptical origins through the 
discussion of the "Cartesian circle" (e.g. Gassendi) and Montaigne's rouet; and (c) Sextus 
Empiricus' diallelus, to which both traditions are to be connected. Unfortunately, Fogelin's 
historical oversight has two major consequences. First, the chapter on Chisholm does not profit 
from an analysis of the latter's paper "The Problem of the Criterion", now chapter five of The 
Foundations of Knowing, a text in which Chisholm discusses Agrippa's three modes explicitly 
and at length. It is to Fogelin's credit that he is capable of getting close to Chisholm's position 






d.interesting than it could have been, had Fogelin attempted to work on the other European 
traditions within which the diallelus has had such a consequential role, from Kant's transcendental 
assimilation of the sceptical challenge to Popper's fallibilism. Empiricism has been a blind alley 
since Sextus' time. On this I thoroughly agree with Fogelin. But there are alternatives. 
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